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Professor Robin Kar's Contract as Empowerment represents
a thoughtful and ambitious effort to introduce a unified general
theory of contract law that, in his words, "offers a fundamental
reinterpretation of the basic principles that animate contract
law"I and that, on this basis, can harmonize the "central doctrinal
challenges for modern contract theory."2As Kar rightly points out,
contract as empowerment goes against the current of prevailing
contract theories. Unlike economic approaches, it is a noninstrumentalist theory that aims to provide a reasonable interpretation
of the settled principles of contract law taken on their own terms.
In doing so, the theory justifies these principles on moral grounds
consistent with contracts having genuine, legally obligatory (coercive) force.3 His conception of interpretive legal theory rejects
the widely and uncritically assumed dichotomy between "descriptive" and "normative" perspectives, arguing instead that a satisfactory approach to law must be both at once. 4 n contrast to promissory theories, contract as empowerment does not rest on or even
"recommend the legal enforcement of the moral obligation to keep
one's promises."5 Moreover, unlike promissory and reliance-based
theories, it recognizes the centrality of the consideration requirement and seeks to explain it.6 In doing so, Kar follows through on
his fundamental contention that, ideally, any viable theory of contract law must have the resources to account for all of contract
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See id at 831-32.
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law's main doctrines and principles within a unified moral framework.7 Finally, as opposed to distributive-justice approaches, contract as empowerment aims to justify the whole of contract law in
light of a nondistributive conception of what is reasonable and fair
as between the two contracting parties.8 Even if, as I argue, there
may be difficulties with some of the answers of the proposed theory, it does make clear the sort of inquiry that is needed if, contrary
to prevailing views, there is to be a sound general interpretive
theory of the main doctrines of contract law.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

According to Professor Kar, contract law should be understood, interpreted, and assessed as aiming to "empower people to
use promises as tools to influence one another's actions and
thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and interests."9
Accomplishing this goal depends, however, on promisees trusting
promisors to fulfill their promises, and when informal bases for
interpersonal trust are absent, enforcement by contract law can
provide the assurance needed to motivate that trust and action
thereon. In this way, a promisor's intent and goal of influencing
promisee conduct can be effectively realized.
However, as Kar correctly observes, the foregoing analysis establishes that a promisor has only an instrumental personal interest in favoring contractual enforcement insofar as this may enable her to effectuate her goal of influencing others.10 But, as Kar
emphasizes, contract law presupposes that parties can have genuine legal obligations to perform, compliance with which can be
legitimately demanded by the promisee and coercively enforced
by the state.11 Enforcement is therefore not just a tool to be used
by the promisor if she views this as in her own separate interest.
Taking up the well-known distinction in moral and political theory between the "rational" and the "reasonable," 12 Kar emphasizes
7

See id at 783-84.
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See id at 815.
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Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 761 (cited in note 1).
Id at 765.
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Id at 767.

See id at 769-71. The most influential account of this distinction is John Rawls's.
See, for example, John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism: Expanded Edition 48-54 (Columbia
2005). Rawls notes that we recognize this distinction in everyday speech when we say of
certain people that, given their strong bargaining position, their proposal may be "perfectly rational" but nevertheless "highly unreasonable." Id at 48. According to Rawls, the
reasonable and the rational are thus two distinct and mutually irreducible, but at the
same time complementary, ideas that are both invoked in specifying just and stable principles for social relations. See id at 51-52. "Persons are reasonable...when, among equals
12
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that whereas a party's instrumental interest in enforcement expresses the idea of the rational, the obligatory constraining nature of enforcement reflects the standpoint of the reasonable.13
The latter is a moral ideal that embodies a notion of equal respect
and fair terms of interaction as between particular contracting
parties. In keeping with this standpoint, it must therefore be possible to show that promisors making promises to influence others'
conduct may legitimately be held to rules of legal enforcement as
genuine legal obligations that ensure fair and reasonable interaction as between them.
This further step of establishing the interpersonal reasonableness and obligation-grounded character of enforcement is accomplished via Kar's application of contractualist justification as
follows:
[C]onsider a promisor who has made a promise in order to
influence another person's actions and thereby meet a real
human need or interest. If a grant of legal authority to demand compliance is reasonably needed for this influence to
work, then this promisor cannot both make a promise like
this and reasonably reject a rule that grants the promisee the
legal authority to demand compliance. . . . This is because a
grant of private authority, backed by the coercive power of

say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and
to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so." Id at 49
(emphasis added). As reasonable persons, they ground their public social relations in the
"desire to engage in fair cooperation ... on terms that others as equals might reasonably
be expected to endorse." Id at 51. Whereas the reasonable has to do with relations between
persons in which each side has equal moral standing for the other, the rational, by contrast, "applies to a single, unified agent (either an individual or corporate person) with the
powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own,"
whether these are self-interested in a narrow sense or much broader in scope and affection.
Id at 50. The rational concerns how these purposes and interests are adopted, affirmed,
and pursued, "as well as [] how they are given priority" from the standpoint of the single
agent. Id at 50. In addition to "means-ends reasoning," rational agents may seek to adjust
and organize their ultimate purposes in light of "their significance for their plan of life as
a whole." Id at 50-51. Very importantly, Rawls says that "neither the reasonable nor the
rational can stand without the other." Id at 52. Rawls also supposes that the ways in which
the ideas of the reasonable and the rational are specified should "tak[e] into account the
kind of social cooperation in question, the nature of the parties and their standing with
respect to one another." Id. Thus, the reasonable and the rational may be specified one
way for private parties mutually related via voluntary (contractual) or involuntary (tortious) transactions, a way quite different than for citizens related politically through participation in a domestic system of social cooperation, and still differently than for peoples
related internationally in a society of peoples. Failure to attend to such possible differences
will vitiate analysis that invokes these concepts. See also John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
A Restatement 6-8 (Belknap 2001); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 28-30 (Harvard 1999).
13 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 769-70 (cited in note 1).
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the state, is needed for the promisor to induce the promisee
to do something of value.
.. .

[I]n these circumstances, private contractual demands

backed by the coercive power of the state are thus justifiable
to the particularsubjects of the demands in terms of their own
empowerment interests. If these promises are legally enforced, then .

.

. they are also genuine legal obligations, be-

cause they are governed by a system of legal rules that no one
can reasonably reject. 14
It is these sorts of promises, enforceable in accordance with
rules that are personally empowering to promisors and consistent
with the equal empowerment of all, that give rise to genuine contractual obligations. They also constitute what he calls "true contracts," which require the basic yet theoretically controverted
principles of contract law, including the standard expectation
damages remedy for breach. Developing a justification for these
principles is his central task in this article.
For this purpose, Kar specifies three core sets of doctrinal
puzzles which, he suggests, any interpretative theory of contract
law would do well to confront and harmonize 15 Indeed, as already
indicated, his view is that a primary task of contract theory is not
only to provide a satisfactory account of each of these areas of doctrinal issues in its own right (because the relevant rules are well
settled, stable, and often mandatory), but also to show how they
fit together in one harmonious whole-something that, he contends, no current theory has yet been able to do.16 As an interpretative theory, contract as empowerment seeks to explain these
doctrines in light of how they are widely understood and presented within the common-law tradition and hence from a legal
point of view.
The first doctrinal puzzle asks why courts enforce purely executory contracts through expectation damages (and less frequently by specific performance) independently of any detrimental reliance by or harm to the victim of a breach. Referring to
the seminal article by Professor Lon Fuller and William Perdue,
which challenges the compensatory character of expectation damages, 17 Kar writes that the availability of these remedies "can be
puzzling because, absent some harm to the victim, it is unclear
14
15

Id at 771-72.
See id at 777-83.
16 See id at 761.
17 See generally L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue Jr, The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 Yale L J 52 (1936).
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why [she] deserves a remedy." 18 I refer to this as the "Absence of
Harm" puzzle. The second puzzle concerns the centrality of the
requirement of consideration for contract formation and the link
between this requirement and the standard remedies for breach.
In connection with this set of issues, he thinks it is essential to
distinguish consideration-based enforceability from the qualitatively different reliance basis of enforceability in promissory estoppel.19 I call this the "Necessity of Consideration" puzzle. Finally, a third puzzle for contract theory has to do with contract
law's seemingly inconsistent treatment of parties' subjective contracting choices. According to Kar, contract law does and must
show appropriate deference to parties' actual subjective (that is,
intended) choices when determining the existence and scope of
contractual obligations.20 At the same time, and seemingly in tension with such "freedom of contract," there are numerous doctrines-he mentions, for instance, the modified objective test for
formation and interpretation, as well as norms of contractual fairness like unconscionability-that deviate from and sometimes
override party choices.21 Are these apparent tensions real and do
they reflect basic inconsistencies at the core of contract doctrine?
The stated objective of Kar's theory is to show that these constellations of doctrinal issues can be explained and harmonized
with a conception of contract as empowerment that incorporates
contractualist criteria, which are more or less supposed22 rather
than defended in their own right.23 As already noted, his account
is presented above all as the most satisfactory interpretative theory of contract law doctrines. In his discussion of different doctrines, Kar makes many points and observations that, in my view,
are correct and illuminating. In keeping with his aim, I want,
however, to raise certain more basic questions and difficulties
that I believe are crucial to the successful elaboration of a satisfactory interpretive theory of contract law. Given limits of space,
I focus primarily on the first two sets of issues, namely, the
"Absence of Harm" and the "Necessity of Consideration" puzzles.

See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 785 (cited in note 1).
See id at 803-04.
20 See id at 806.
21 See id at 809-12 (discussing the modified objective test); id at 815-17 (discussing
unconscionability).
22 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 771 (cited in note 1).
23 See id at 828-30 (cited in note 1).
18

19
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II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT

A.

The Conception of Contractual Relation

We should begin by identifying some basic premises of the
theory. How it views the contractual relation is surely such a
premise-for upon this, everything else turns. Professor Kar's
contractualist criterion-whether anyone similarly situated and
motivated could reasonably reject a proposed principle or rule in
light of the available alternatives24-iS applied to and within the
parameters of the contractual relation as he understands it.
What, then, is the theory's conception of this relation? We have
seen that it takes contract as a mechanism or tool through which
one party, the promisor, can influence the action of another, the
promisee, in ways that the promisor intends.25 This relation
moves essentially in one direction only: originating with the
promisor's intent to influence the promisee and culminating, if
successful, in the promisee doing the intended act. While the
promisor, by promising, gets the promisee to do something, the
same does not hold in the other direction (for the promisee with
respect to the promisor). Rather, the promisee's action counts
simply as the intended and hoped-for effect of the promisor's act
of promising. Its relevance and role lie in the fact that it is merely
part of the realization of the promisor's purposes.
Similarly, the promisee's trust, which may be necessary to
motivate her action, is simply a causally relevant factor in bringing the promisor's purpose to fruition.26 In contrast to the role of
trust in Professor Charles Fried's explanation of promissory
duty,27 the generation of trust here has no moral significance or
implications and certainly is not made the basis of any separate,
let alone legally protected, concern for the promisee vis-A-vis the
promisor. If, as Kar contends, empowerment is a capability, 28 it is
one that, as between promisor and promisee and in the context of
their interaction, is exercised by only the promisor. It is true that
the theory postulates a requirement of equal empowerment. 29
However, as employed in the theory, "equal empowerment" refers

See id at 770.
See id at 771-72.
26 Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 763 (cited in note 1).
27 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 16
(Oxford 2d ed 2015) ("The obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of
utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust.").
28 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 764 (cited in note 1).
24
25

29

Id at 773.
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to the fact that this very same capability may be exercised by the
second party if and when she figures as a promisor vis-A-vis the
first, who would then count as the promisee.30 Both sides, in other
words, have empowerment interests qua promisors. The unidirectional analysis of cause and effect is simply applied in the reverse
direction insofar as the parties switch roles. But this presupposes
a second separate transaction. Thus, there would be at most two
distinct and separate unidirectional movements from promisor to
promisee; and these movements, it should be emphasized, would
be neither interconnected nor joined with each other and so could
not form an intrinsically two-way, mutually inducing bilateral
relation.
This may all seem rather abstract. But, as I will now try to
show, the difficulty with this conception of the contractual relation is that it is directly at odds with the very doctrines that the
theory aims to justify, thus precluding a satisfactory, let alone a
unified, account of the central doctrinal puzzles.
B.

The Absence of Harm Puzzle Reconsidered

To start, what exactly is the Absence of Harm puzzle with
respect to expectation damages as presented by Fuller and
Perdue? As the authors note, it is a fundamental and generally
accepted rule of the common law that in giving damages for
breach of contract, the law should, so far as can be done by money,
seek to place the plaintiff in the same position as he would have
been if the contract had been performed, and that, in so doing, the
law is compensating the plaintiff for injury caused by the
breach.31 Against this view, Professor Fuller and Perdue object:
"[y]et in this case we 'compensate' the plaintiff by giving him
something he never had. This seems on the face of things a queer
kind of 'compensation."' 32 As a consequence, the authors contend
that the justification for both expectation damages and specific
performance "loses its self-evident quality."33 Their question is,
"[W]hy should a promise which has not been relied on ever be enforced at all, whether by a decree of specific performance or by an
award of damages?"34

30
31
32

33
34
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It is clear then that, for Fuller and Perdue, the puzzle about
the standard remedies for breach is that the law's characterization of relief as compensatory seems wrong unless mere nonperformance of an un-relied-upon promise actually injures the promisee by depriving the promisee of something that she "had" as a
result of contract formation and, thus, prior to the time performance was due. More precisely, the promisee must have acquired
this possession through the parties' mutual assent at formation.
But having rejected this possibility, Fuller and Perdue conclude
that breach of an un-relied-upon contract does not harm or injure
the promisee as such, and that any plausible justification for the
standard remedies must be part of distributive justice and rest on
policy considerations, both economic and reliance-based.35
The difficulty with Professor Kar's theory of contract as empowerment as an interpretative account of the law is that-far
from elucidating the doctrinal understanding of contract remedies as compensation for injury caused by breach and answering
the Fuller and Perdue challenge-his account, despite its claim to
be nondistributive, only ensures that there can be no alternative
to their objection or to a policy-based solution. This is because
contract as empowerment makes the whole question of compensation for injury irrelevant.36 Let me briefly explain.
On Kar's view, contract enforcement in general, and the
standard remedies in particular, helps effectuate (in the absence
of informal interpersonal trust) the promisor's intention to influence promisee's action via her promise. Enforcement is needed to
motivate the promisee to take the promise seriously and to feel
confident that the promisor will perform as promised so that, on
this basis, the promisee will take the action the promisor wants.
The focus is on the promisor's empowerment interests. Kar argues that, having made a promise to influence promisee conduct
that needs legal enforcement to be effective, the promisor cannot
reasonably reject a rule that authorizes enforcement in cases of

&

35 See Fuller and Perdue, 46 Yale L J at 59-63 (cited in note 17). Fuller and Perdue
frame their point in terms of Aristotle's distinction between corrective and distributive
justice. See id at 56. In contrast to other measures of contract damages-and I might add
damages in tort law, which are compensatory in character and are instances of corrective
justice-only the expectation measure, along with specific performance, must be explained
as distributive justice. And "[w]ith the transition [to distributive justice], the justification
for legal relief loses its self-evident quality." Id at 56-57.
36 This is despite Kar's evident acknowledgement that the standard legal point of
view does see contract damages as compensatory. See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 780-81
n 67 (cited in note 1). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356, comment a (1981)
("The central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not
punitive.").

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol83/iss1/16

8

Benson: The Demands of an Interpretive Theory of Contract

198

The University of Chicago Law Review Online

[83:190

noncompliance.37 But why not? Enforcement is needed just as a
means to effectuate the promisor's intention and thus presupposes that intention: If her intention changes and she regrets her
promise, why should there be any question of enforcement as between the parties in the absence of any injury, wrong, or loss
caused to the promisee?38 However, the theory provides no basis
for incorporating such consequences, which would be all on the
promisee's side, as part of the protection of the promisor's empowerment interests. The idea of compensation does not apply and
can have no traction. In the words of Fuller and Perdue, the justification for legal enforcement loses its self-evident quality.
This same basic difficulty also affects the theory's more specific arguments for expectation damages over reliance. Kar suggests that enforcement in accordance with expectation damages
"tend[s] to give [the] promisor[] greater ability to choose the level
of inducement that [she] seek[s] to generate by making [a] legally
enforceable promise[ ]."39 Offhand, this emphasis on greater
choice and control seems misplaced when we consider that, as
Fuller and Perdue themselves note, contracts are ordinarily silent
about the question of damages and parties are said to contemplate
performance, not breach or legally coercive responses to breach.40
Moreover, assume that a moment after mutual promises have
been exchanged and before either party has done or forgone anything of value in reliance on the contract, one of the parties regrets her promise and reneges. In these circumstances, is it
clearly reasonable and fair for the other party to demand the expectancy just because the expectancy may have provided the level
of assurance and inducement that we presume the promisor
would have chosen to make her intention effective at the time she
had this intention? In the absence of showing that expectation
damages (or specific performance) correlate with and repair a
genuine loss sustained by the promisee as a result of breach, there
is no legal argument for awarding this measure over reliance-or
indeed, any remedy at all.
Note that I have framed my objection in terms of what is reasonable and fair between the parties. This is certainly in keeping
with the usual approach of contractualism. My point here-as

See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 771, 787 (cited in note 1).
Note Kar's starting assumption that the puzzle of expectation damages-and the
reason a victim of a contractual breach deserves a remedy-arises "because there has not
yet been any harm caused to the victim of the breach." Id at 785 n 84 (emphasis added).
39 Id at 790.
40 See Fuller and Perdue, 46 Yale L J at 58 (cited in note 17).
37

38
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with the previous discussion of enforceability-is that Kar's empowerment argument for the nonrejectability of expectation damages does not, despite its aim and apparent formulation, actually
incorporate the needed dimension of the reasonable.41 It represents at most an argument for internal consistency within the
standpoint of the promisor's own intention and purposes at the
time she promises. In contractualist terms, it reflects nothing
more than the promisor's consistent pursuit of her purposes at a
certain moment under the idea of the rational. But this does not
explain why her first stance should govern later when her intention changes, let alone why others have standing to respond coercively to the promisor's change of mind. Changing one's mind is
an exercise of the powers of rational deliberation and decision in
the pursuit of one's good.
It might be thought that the dimension of the reasonable can
be incorporated by taking into account-as a norm of equal empowerment would seem to require-the second party's own empowerment interests insofar as she is a promisor in her own right.
But, as I suggested earlier, this simply brings into play her own
distinct standpoint in seeking to influence the first party's actions
in a way that, just as we saw with the first party, does not inherently or directly incorporate the promisee's interest in performance as normatively relevant. In other words, this merely multiplies the number of exercises of empowerment, each of which
separately and distinctly expresses the powers of the rational,
without directly linking the two sides in a way that brings to bear
the moral requirements of the reasonable. The result is just a
more complex juxtaposition of distinct efforts by each side to influence the other's action.42
41 In this respect, contract as empowerment is even more lacking than Fried's theory
of contract as promise. See generally Fried, Contract as Promise (cited in note 27). Fried's
theory, in virtue of its account of trust as a distinct morally significant factor, shows how
the promisee has moral interests on her side, which arguably justify, as a matter of reasonableness, some kind of obligation on the side of the promisor. See note 27 and accompanying text.
42 In light of this complexity, it would seem arbitrary to ignore the fact that both
parties may have different, relevant intentions and may engage in different kinds of relevant conduct (for example, promising, forgoing opportunities, actually performing, etc.) at
different times, and not to take these different and often conflicting factors into account
when applying "a system of obligations that no one who is similarly motivated could reasonably reject." Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 770 (cited in note 1). Equal treatment of both sides
would seem to require an appropriate weighting and sequencing (if not combining) of the
different instrumentally justified remedial measures along the timeline from formation to
breach. Moreover, under this approach, it would also seem arbitrary to ignore the cumulative negative effects of noncompliance on the credibility and efficacy of contract as a
socially available and existing tool for empowerment, quite apart from how breach may
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Kar contrasts reliance theories, which focus on the reliance
interests of the promisee, and contract as empowerment, which is
concerned with the empowerment interests of promisors.43 To incorporate requirements of the fair and reasonable that hold as between a particular promisor and her promisee,44 the theory must,
however, explain the contractual relevance of the promisee's expectation or performance interest in a way that satisfactorily answers Fuller and Perdue's challenge. By anchoring the rationale
in the promisor's intention and purpose independently of any consideration of the existence and significance of nonreliance loss
sustained by the other party, contract as empowerment cannot
make sense of-and in fact simply ignores-the law's understanding of expectation damages as compensatory. 45
C.

The Necessity of Consideration Puzzle Reconsidered

With this mention of the contrast with reliance, I would like
now to turn to Kar's treatment of the requirement of consideration, which he takes-rightly in my view-to be distinctive of the
contractual relation46 and intrinsically connected with the standard remedies of expectation damages and specific performance.47
According to Kar, the centrality and necessity of consideration are
explained by the fact that contract law is framed to serve the empowerment interests of both parties equally.48 Whereas many
commentators are skeptical about the coherence and the role of

affect individual interests in particular instances. However, it is not clear how the theory
of contract as empowerment would handle these questions. For an instructive discussion
of this complexity from an economic standpoint, see Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and
Perdue, 67 U Chi L Rev 99, 107-11 (2000).
43 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 776 (cited in note 1).
44 Kar, rightly in my view, emphasizes that an interpretive account, particularly one
that is contractualist, should apply as between the two particular parties to a contract.
See, for example, id at 771-72.
45 For this reason, despite the theory's emphasis on the promisee's exclusive standing
to sue, id at 798-99, it cannot account for the basic fact that damages must be paid to the
promisee rather than, say, to the state by way of a fine. Contract as empowerment may be
able to explain why a sanction should be available and imposed in order to bolster the
credibility of the promisor's power to induce promisee action; but for this purpose, the only
thing necessary is that the promisor pays it, irrespective of the person or entity to which
it is given. Of course, it may be necessary to incentivize the promisee to sue the promisorbut this amount need not coincide with full expectation damages.
46 See id at 802.
47 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 803 (cited in note 1).
48
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consideration,49 contract as empowerment, he suggests, offers a
straightforward explanation. Is this in fact the case?
The first thing to note is that the surface fit between the idea
of empowerment and the requirement of consideration is stipulated, not necessary. The core idea of empowerment, as Kar construes it, is the capability of one person to influence the action of
another by making a credible promise.so Contract enforcement is
justified as conducive to fulfilling the exercise of this power. But
as Kar rightly emphasizes, consideration refers to a promise or
act that is requested by the promisor to be provided by the promisee in return for her promise-and that is so given by the promisee. 51 This is clearly a subset of the ways in which a promisor can
influence the promisee by promising. For one, a promisor can certainly intend to induce promisee action without treating the action as quid pro quo. This is precisely the nature of promiseinduced detrimental reliance.52 Prima facie, then, reliance-based
liability, which does not require consideration, would seem to protect empowerment interests.
Kar defines empowerment as "a capability to achieve valuable beings and doings" as the intended outcomes of promisor inducement.53 At the same time, he denies that promises to reward
past conduct54 or to induce feelings55 involve the exercise of empowerment. But why can't a promisor seek to influence the promisee's feelings in order to generate in her certain expectations and
hopes that the promisor views as worthwhile, not only in themselves but also as a means to encourage the promisee to engage
life opportunities in a certain way? This seems clearly to illustrate
the idea of empowerment. And although such promises may ordinarily be made to promisees who already informally trust the
promisor, this need not be the case. If not, there should in princi-

49 Id at 799 n 124 (summarizing the ambivalence of commentators who subscribe to
a promise-based theory of contract). See also Fried, Contractas Promise at 28-39 (cited in
note 27).
50 See Kar, U Chi L Rev at 761 (cited in note 1).
51 See id at 799.
52 Recall here Justice Benjamin Cardozo's formulation of the (noncontractual) principle in Glanzer u Shepard, 135 NE 275 (NY 1922), when he held that the defendants were
under a duty of care toward the plaintiffs in making representations to them "not casually
nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an independent calling and . . . with the very
end and aim of shaping the conduct of another." Id at 277.
53 Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 774 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
54 See id at 775, citing Dougherty u Salt, 125 NE 94, 95 (NY 1919).
55 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 797 (cited in note 1).
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ple-according to Kar's own analysis-be a role for legal enforceability of the promise. In other words, a purely gratuitous promise
would be enforceable.
To make even a prima facie case of fit between empowerment
interests and consideration, Kar must and does limit those interests to a special subclass of promises that seek to induce a promise
or performance from the promisee in return. This, I have tried to
show, is a purely stipulated, ad hoc limit that is not entailed by
the idea of empowerment itself as he conceives it. But it is only if
this limit is introduced that Kar can claim that "[i]t follows-with
almost mathematical elegance-that contract as empowerment
recommends the legal enforcement of all and only those promises
that are supported by legal consideration in the technical sense of
the word." 56
Beyond this, there seem to be even more basic difficulties
with this account that arise from the way contract as empowerment conceives of the parties' interaction
First, since the late sixteenth century, 57 the doctrine of consideration has viewed return promises and acts as on a par. The
law treats the return promise as the second party's complete and
crystallized manifestation of choice which establishes, jointly
with the first promise, the contractual relation. Juridically, the
return promise counts as that party's act no differently than a
return act. It is important to account for this, not only as a matter
of interpretive theory, but also because it bears on the possibility
of answering the Fuller and Perdue challenge. To explain expectation damages as compensatory, the parties' mutual promises
must count as acts, complete and fully effectual at formation and
therefore prior to actual performance, that vest each of them with
rightful possession of the performance promised by the other. But
the basis for viewing their mutual promises as such is by no
means self-evident. And in fact, because empowerment gives a
central role to a party's pursuit of her subjective interests and
preferences,58 it is even more puzzling: a promisor wants to obtain
the promisee's action and, as a matter of preference satisfaction,
it is the fulfillment of the promise-actual performance-rather
than the promise as such that would seem to be the thing that is

Id at 800.
For an excellent historical account, see generally David J. Ibbetson, Consideration
and the Theory of Contract in Sixteenth Century Common Law, in John Barton, ed, Towards a General Law of Contract 67 (Duncker & Humblot 1990).
58 See Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 806-08 (cited in note 1).
56

57
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sought and valued. Although Kar stipulates empowerment interests with respect to the subclass of acts and promises given in
return,5 9 the inclusion of promises needs a justification, and contract as empowerment does not seem able to provide it.
Second and in sharp contrast with the empowerment theory's
unidirectional conception of relation, the crucial and distinctive
hallmark of the requirement of consideration is that it necessitates the establishment of a thoroughly bilateral or two-sided relation: each side is specified in relation to the other and has no
contractual relevance except in this mutual relatedness.60 It must
be emphasized that this intrinsic relatedness is not reducible to
the joining of two sides each of which can be defined or be relevant
apart from the other. Their joinder is an inherent defining characteristic of each. Moreover, as may clearly be seen in the paradigm case of mutual promises, the two sides required by the doctrine of consideration must each actively and identically
contribute to contract formation: each simultaneously requests
and is requested by the other. Doctrinally, these features are expressed in the requirements that the promises must be simultaneously and mutually related as quid pro quo and thereby be mutually inducing. The irreducibly basic unit of analysis is just this
two-sided transaction: it is thus impossible to distinguish any unidirectional analysis going from one side to the other, and the interests in performance of both must count inseparably and at the
same time or not at all. Unless they are mutually inducing in this
strict sense, they are each nothing more than gratuitous
promises.
CONCLUSION

In my view, the central challenge to contract as empowerment as an interpretative theory is the mismatch between the
way it construes the contractual relation (namely, as unidirectional) and what that relation is, and must be, in accordance with
the consideration requirement (namely, strictly two-sided and
mutually inducing). Not only does this mismatch prevent the theory from providing a satisfactory account of consideration, but it
also closes off the possibility of the theory harmonizing the main
principles and doctrines that animate contract law in one unified
interpretive view.

59

See id at 763.

For detailed discussion, see generally Peter Benson, The Idea of Consideration,61
U Toronto L J 241 (2011).
60
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Rather than presupposing a prior normative conception
(whether empowerment or some other moral6l or economic62 conception) with its preconceived idea of relationship and then applying it to contract law, an interpretative account of contract
must try to discern and to make explicit the kind of relationship
that is pervasively supposed in the settled doctrines and principles of contract law: if found, such a relationship would function
as contract law's internal organizing idea, through which we
could make sense of and hold together its many doctrines.63 So far
as the common law is concerned, I suggest that it is the relation
consisting of the parties' mutual assents-as specified by the doctrine of consideration-that constitutes this basic contractual relation and the organizing idea of contract law. Although beyond
the scope of this response, this can, I believe, be demonstrated via
a thorough discussion of that doctrine and its role in the whole
economy of contract law principles and doctrines.64
As part of this alternative interpretative approach, it would
be crucial to show that the promise-for-consideration relation,
consisting just of the parties' mutual promises, can reasonably be
construed in its own terms as embodying a form of mutual or
transactionalacquisition that is presently and fully effective at
contract formation, prior to and independent of actual (physical)
performance or any detrimental reliance.65 Only in this way can
the Fuller-Perdue challenge be answered and expectation remedies be explained as compensatory within a rights-based, nondistributive account such as that presupposed by contract as
empowerment.
In addition to bringing out an intrinsic connection between
consideration and performance remedies, it would also be essential to explain: how the basic promise-for-consideration relation

61 See, for example, Fried, Contract as Promise at 14-17 (cited in note 27) (presenting
an independently given moral conception of promissory duty).
62 See, for example, Craswell, 67 U Chi L Rev at 107-11 (cited in note 42).
63 An interpretative account of this kind could (if properly developed) arguably satisfy the requirements of public justificationin Rawls's sense of that term. See, for example,
Rawls, Justice as Fairness at 26-29 (cited in note 12).
64 I try to do this to some extent in Peter Benson, The Unity of ContractLaw, in Peter
Benson, ed, The Theory of ContractLaw: New Essays 118, 153-184 (Cambridge 2001), and
more completely (and hopefully more adequately) in a forthcoming book, Justice in Transactions: A Theory of ContractLaw. This view of consideration as defining the basic contractual relation would be consistent with Professor Kar's own view that only promises
supported by consideration are "true contracts." Kar, 83 U Chi L Rev at 800-04 (cited in
note 1).
65 See Benson, The Unity of Contract at 132 (cited in note 64) (arguing that in contract scenarios, "the entitlement is transferred at the moment of agreement").
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necessarily involves an implicit dimension comprising implied
obligations, excusing doctrines such as mistake and impossibility;66 as well as why mutual promises that are not mere gratuitous
promises can nevertheless be set aside under a principle of unconscionability because of grossly inadequate consideration or, in
other words, because of a striking and unexplained disproportion
between the values exchanged. The latter would be no easy task
given that the doctrine of consideration, which we take as our
starting point, is itself expressly unconcerned about and indifferent toward the very thing that raises a question of contractual
fairness, namely the comparative values of the mutual promises.67
These and many more questions of fit remain to be explored and,
if possible, to be accounted for. But if we can show through this
kind of analysis that contract law embodies fair and reasonable
principles for persons standing to each other in a definite kind of
social relation6e-here the promise-for-consideration relationsuch a theory should count not only as general and interpretive
but also as contractualist in character.

66 This whole implied dimension is unaccounted for by Professor Fried's promise
principle-as Fried himself recognizes. See Fried, Contract as Promise at 57-73 (cited in
note 27).
67 In my earlier piece, The Unity of ContractLaw, I tried to explain how the doctrines
of consideration and unconscionability can be viewed as mutually supportive even withand partly because of-their differences. See Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 193
(cited in note 64).
68 Rawls, undoubtedly the greatest modern theorist in this tradition, takes this
standpoint in all his writings. See generally, for example, his early discussion in John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, in Samuel Freeman, ed, John Rawls: Collected Papers 47, 4772 (Harvard 1999), and more recently in Rawls, Justice as Fairness 11-14 (cited in
note 12).
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